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REFINING PRODUCT MARKET DEFINITION




The last decade has seen unprecedented consolidation in the
banking industry.' 1995 was a record year for bank mergers in
terms of both the number of transactions and the dollar value of
those transactions.' Antitrust scrutiny of the mergers and acquisi-
tions comprising this consolidation has also increased, as prospec-
tive acquirers have turned from market-expanding mergers involv-
ing banks in different markets to in-market mergers, which remove
competitors from a given market and are thus more likely to raise
antitrust concerns.3
Each prospective bank merger 4 is subject to review by the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, as is true of
1. See Dean F. Amel, Trends in the Structure of Federally Insured Depository Insti-
tutions, 82 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 1, 6 (1995). The rate of consolidation in the banking
industry has increased fourfold over that period. See Sherrill Shaffer, Bank Competition in
Concentrated Markets, Bus. REV. (FED. RESERVE BANK OF P-ILA.), Mar-Apr. 1994, at
3.
2. See U.S. Bank Deals Led 1995 Merger Activity, Reuters, Dec. 29, 1995, available
in LEXIS, Bankng library, Cumws file. The assets involved in bank mergers in
1995-approximately 60 billion dollars-were more than double the previous record. See
Anne K. Bingaman, Antitrust and Banking, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 465, 467 (1996).
3. See Michael A. Greenspan, Documentation Can Help Blunt Challenges to In-Mar-
ket Mergers, AM. BANKER, Feb. 15, 1994, at 17; Cynthia A. Glassman, Merger Plans
Need Careful Antitrust Analysis, AM. BANKER, June 24, 1992, at 4. "Market-expanding
mergers" are mergers between two firms operating in different geographic areas, which
provide the surviving firm with instant access to a larger geographic market. "In-market
mergers" are mergers between firms operating in the same geographic area, which are
usually consummated in order to enhance efficiency and lower costs by taking advantage
of economies of scale. See W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND
ANTrrRUST 199-207 (2d ed. 1995).
4. Throughout this Note, the term "bank merger" will refer to any merger or acqui-
sition involving two banks, a bank and a bank holding company, two bank holding com-
panies, or a bank and a thrift institution in a merger and conversion under 12 U.S.C.
§ 1815(d)(2), (3) (1994). While there are many differences between the regulation of
operations of these different conglomerations, the regulation of mergers between them is
basically uniform, and the antitrust review of such mergers is almost entirely uniform.
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mergers in other industries.' Bank mergers, however, are also
subject to review by the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve or by one of several other federal banking agencies.6 While
the federal banking agencies' antitrust review powers derive from
different legislation than those of the Antitrust Division,7 the
basic standard of review established by the federal banking laws is
the same as that established by Section 7 of the Clayton Act: the
responsible federal banking agency must not approve any merger
which would create a monopoly, would be in furtherance of any
combination or conspiracy to monopolize, or would substantially
lessen competition or restrain trade in any "section of the coun-
try."9 However, because the Antitrust Division and the federal
5. See Gina M. Killian, Bank Mergers and the Department of Justice's Horizontal
Merger Guidelines: A Critique and Proposal, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 857, 859 (1994).
Federal law requires that prospective bank mergers be referred to the Antitrust Division
for prior review. See Bank Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(4) (1994). The Federal Trade
Commission thus does not review bank mergers.
6. The Federal Reserve is responsible for antitrust review of the merger if the
surviving bank will be a state-chartered member of the Federal Reserve System, or if
either participant in the merger is a bank holding company. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1828(c),
1842(a) (1994). The Federal Reserve thus has jurisdiction over the lion's share of bank
mergers, and will be the primary banking agency referred to in this Note. If the surviv-
ing bank is to be a national bank, then the responsible agency is the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC); if the surviving bank is to be a state non-member bank, then the re-
sponsible agency is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); and if the surviv-
ing institution is to be a thrift (i.e., a savings and loan), then the Office of Thrift Super-
vision (OTS) is to be the reviewing agency. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c).
7. The banking agencies' antitrust review powers derive from the Bank Merger Act,
12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (governing mergers between federally-insured commercial banks); the
Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a), (c) (governing mergers to which one
of the parties is a bank holding company, or of which the resulting institution will be a
bank holding company); and the Change in Bank Control Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C.
§ 18170) (governing acquisitions by individuals). The Antitrust Division's merger review
powers derive primarily from Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
9. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5) (providing the standard used to determine when a pro-
posed bank merger transaction will be approved under the Bank Merger Act); 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (providing the standard used to determine when a proposed business combination is
illegal under the Clayton Act). Unlike the Clayton Act, however, the banking laws ex-
plicitly provide an escape hatch: a merger may be approved if the responsible agency
finds that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed merger are outweighed by any
positive effects that serve the "convenience and needs" of the community. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1828(c)(5)(B). The Antitrust Division does not consider such "convenience and needs,"
but does analyze any "countervailing efficiencies" that may result from the merger. See
infra notes 33-39 and accompanying text. Like the "countervailing efficiencies" defense
available to merger partners in other industries, the "convenience and needs" defense is
not a viable litigation strategy for several reasons: the defense is limited by the same
information and cost problems that plague the efficiencies defense, see id.; the burden of
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banking agencies have different missions, the standards and meth-
ods of review differ between the two agencies in several re-
spects.'"
One point on which the Antitrust Division and the Federal
Reserve differ is the method for defining the relevant product
market to be analyzed. In order to determine whether a prospec-
tive merger would lessen competition in a "section of the coun-
try,"" both the Antitrust Division and the Federal Reserve must
define a particular section of the country which would be suscepti-
ble to any anticompetitive effect that might result from the merger
in question. 2 This determination requires the agencies to define
both a relevant geographic market and a relevant product mar-
ket.3 The relevant geographic market is defined as the area in
which a hypothetical monopolist could impose an increase in the
price of its products without fear that competition would force the
monopolist to abandon its attempt to increase prices.'4 The rele-
proving the defense at trial is on the defendant, see United States v. First City Nat'l
Bank of Houston, 386 U.S. 361, 366 (1967); and the defense is available only when the
proposed merger is necessary to support a weak acquiree bank, see Mid-Nebraska
Bancshares v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 627 F.2d 266, 271 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (citing United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968)).
10. See Michael A. Greenspan, Justice and Banking Agencies Still Analyze Bank
Mergers Differently, BANKING POL'Y REP., Sept. 4, 1995, at 17. A 1982 General Account-
ing Office review found that "there was no uniformity to the [bank merger review] eval-
uations nor had specific criteria been developed for making the evaluations.... This
overall lack of uniformity has resulted in conflicting decisions by Federal regulators and
subsequent 'agency shopping' by financial institutions." JONATHAN R. MACEY &
GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 447 (1992).
Since that time, the Antitrust Division and the federal banking agencies have done
much to make the bank merger review process more uniform and more predictable.
However, differences remain: as noted supra note 9, the Division and agencies still use
slightly different methods of considering countervailing efficiencies or "convenience and
needs." The Division and agencies also use very different methods of product market
definition-the subject of this Note. See Robert E. Litan, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Assessment of Bank Mergers,
Address Before the Antitrust Section of the ABA (Apr. 6, 1994) available in Speeches by
Senior Members of the Antitrust Division (visited Jan. 19, 1997) <http:/www.usdoj.gov/
gopherdata/atr/talks/litan.txt>.
11. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B).
12. See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 1, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 41,554 (1992)
[hereinafter Merger Guidelines]; see also ROGER D. BLAIR & DAvID L. KASERMAN,
ANTr[RUST ECONOMICS 237 (1985) (stating that "the courts must decide whether the
merger will result in a substantial lessening of competition or tendency to create a mo-
nopoly in any line of commerce in any section of the country").
13. See BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 12, at 237.
14. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 12, § 1.21, at 41,555; Viscusi ET AL., supra
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vant product market similarly is defined as the product or prod-
ucts whose prices the hypothetical monopolist could raise without
fear that competition would force it to lower its prices." In the
context of commercial bank mergers, the traditional method of
defining the relevant product market has been to include in that
market all the products and services traditionally provided by
commercial banks, including products such as loans and services.
such as acceptance of savings and checking deposits and provision
of trust services.16 This method is still used by the Federal Re-
serve.17 In recent years, however, the Antitrust Division has
abandoned this "cluster market" method of product market def-
inition. 8 It has instead adopted a method of disaggregation of
the traditional cluster of bank products and services into several
submarkets, with particular emphasis on the market for commer-
cial lending to small and medium-sized businesses. 9 Because the
Division's method is intended to determine whether any of these
several submarkets may be susceptible to anticompetitive effects,
its scrutiny is now widely regarded as more stringent than that of
the Fed.2°
note 3, at 212-14.
15. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 12, § 1.11, at 41,554; ViScuSI Er AL., supra
note 3, at 212-14.
16. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 326 n. 5 (1963). This
method of product market definition is referred to as the "cluster market" method, and
is explained further in Part I, infra. Cluster markets also appear in other industries, such
as fire and burglar alarm services, see United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,
572-73 (1966), acute care hospital services, see American Medicorp, Inc. v. Humana, Inc.,
445 F. Supp. 589, 603-04 (E.D. Pa. 1977), and beauty products, see JBL Enter. v.
Jhirmack Enter., 698 F.2d 1011, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 1983).
17. See KErrH R. FISHER, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS OF BANKS AND SAVINGS
INSTITUTIONS § 3.12, at. 3:88-90 (1993); Greenspan, supra note 10, at 17.
18. See infra Section I.B.3.
19. See id. In this Note, the term "submarket" is used to refer to the specific prod-
uct markets which together might constitute one cluster market. This use of the term is
meant to be distinct from its use in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294
(1962), and its progeny, to refer opaquely to "narrow relevant markets within broader
relevant markets," Lawrence C. Maisel, Submarkets in Merger and Monopolization Cases,
72 GEO. L. 39, 39, 42-44 (1983-84), which "never had any theoretical justification ...
and created much confusion in the law." Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant
Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1849 n.182 (1990).
20. See, eg., Eugene M. Katz, Comment, Justice Department Stance in Hawaii May
Be Signal of Merger Fights Ahead, AM. BANKER, Apr. 19, 1991, at 4 (noting that the
Antitrust Division's shift to the disaggregative method of product market definition will
impact significantly upon consolidation decisions made by American financial institutions).
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Part I of this Note briefly surveys the theoretical background
and legal history of the ongoing conflict between the Antitrust
Division and the Fed with regard to product market definition in
the antitrust analysis of bank mergers. Part II compares and cri-
tiques the two approaches to product market definition, noting
theoretical and empirical shortcomings of both the Fed's cluster
market method of product market definition and the Antitrust
Division's disaggregative submarket method. Part III suggests a
reconciliation of the two approaches that would ameliorate some
of the flaws in each, would offer both the Antitrust Division and
the federal banking agencies greater flexibility to account for the
effects on competition created by thrifts and other non-bank pro-
viders of financial products and services, and would better protect
competition and consumers from potential anticompetitive effects
of a proposed bank merger.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Merger Analysis in General
The Antitrust Division's general method for determining
whether a proposed merger will likely have significant anti-
competitive effects is outlined in the 1992 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines.21 This method is also used by the Fed and the other
federal banking agencies?' The analysis begins with the definition
of the relevant market.' A "market" consists of both a product
market and a geographic market, that is:
a product or group of products and a geographic area in which it
is produced or sold such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing
firm, not subject to price regulation, that was the only present
and future producer or seller of those products in that area likely
would impose at least a "small but significant and nontransitory"
increase in price ["SSNPI"], assuming the terms of sale of all
other products are held constant.24
21. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 12, § 0.2, at 41,554.
22. See FISHER, supra note 17, § 3.12.1, at 3:90-98. See also Adoption of Policy
Statement, 54 Fed. Reg. 39,043 (1989) (outlining FDIC merger review process, which was
adopted after Antitrust Division commented "in considerable detail," and which in many
particulars presaged Antitrust Division's 1992 Merger Guidelines).
23. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 12, § 1, at 41,554.
24. Id.
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The relevant market includes only the "group of products and a
geographic area that [are] no bigger than necessary to satisfy this
test." '
The constituent product market and geographic market are
defined by demand substitution factors, i.e., possible consumer
responses to the imposition of an SSNPI. The relevant geo-
graphic market comprises the geographic area where a hypothetical
monopolist could impose an SSNPI without local customers sub-
stituting products from other areas for its product and thus forcing
the monopolist to lower its price againY Similarly, the relevant
product market is that product or group of products upon whose
prices a hypothetical monopolist could impose an SSNPI without
its customers substituting other products for the monopolist's and
thus forcing it to lower its prices again.' Product and geographic
markets are correctly defined when they "recognize competition
where, in fact, competition exists." 29
25. Id.
26. See id. The SSNPI is usually characterized as a price 5% above the current level
or 10% above the competitive level. See PHILuP AREEDA ET AL, ANTITRUST LAW
560, at 251 (1995).
27. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 12, § 1.21, at 41,555-56. The definition of
product markets is thus based on the cross-elasticity of demand between the product of
the potential monopolist and possible substitutes for that product. Cross-elasticity refers to
the responsiveness of demand for possible substitutes in response to an increase in the
price of the potential monopolist's product; the more responsive the demand for substi-
tutes, the higher the cross-elasticity. See BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 12, at 108-09;
United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 400 (1956).
28. The product market is defined as those products susceptible to the exercise of
market power because it is the exercise of market power that merger review is designed
to prevent. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 12, § 0.1, at 41,553, §1.11, at 41,554-555.
The Division utilizes a number of different kinds of evidence of substitutability,
including- 1) evidence that buyers have in the past substituted products in response to a
price increase; 2) evidence that sellers base business decisions on the prospect that their
customers might substitute others' products for theirs; 3) the effects of downstream com-
petition on buyers, such as, the size of buyers' margins on resale of the monopolist's
product, and thus the limits of their tolerance for a price increase; and 4) the timing and
costs to buyers of switching products. See id. These effects are in turn estimated by raw
data from the potential relevant market, such as sales data and traffic patterns. The
substitutability of banking products and services can be obscured by the Division's and
the Fed's use of deposits as a proxy for market share, instead of addressing market share
directly through sales and other data normally utilized in the analysis of mergers in other
industries. See infra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
29. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 326. While principles of market definition are straight-
forward in the abstract, their application in antitrust cases is often very problematic. See,
&g., U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 598 (1st Cir. 1993) ("There
is no subject in antitrust law more confusing than market definition.").
[Vol. 46:865
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Once the relevant market has been defined, the Antitrust
Division and the federal banking agencies first proceed to deter-
mine whether or not a proposed merger would significantly in-
crease concentration in the relevant market and result in a high
level of concentration in that market." Second, the Division and
the federal banking agencies assess whether the merger raises
concerns about potential anticompetitive effects resulting from in-
creased concentration or other factors.3' Third, the Division and
the agencies assess whether other firms would be likely to enter
the market to compete with the survivor of the merger and pre-
vent supracompetitive price increases. 2 Fourth, the Division and
the agencies assess any efficiency gains that might result from the
merger.33 Finally, the Division and the agencies consider the pos-
sibility that the merger may be necessary to prevent the failure of
one of the parties.'
Market definition is very often determinative of the final
outcome, of merger analysis 5 The crucial role of market defini-
tion is largely due to the considerable costs and information defi-
cits that plague defendants' attempts to present a defense of coun-
30. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 12, § 1, at 41,554.
31. See id. § 2, at 41,557.
32. See id. § 3, at 41,561. A supracompetitive price increase is an increase to a price
above that which would prevail if consumers could freely substitute competitors' products
for those of the monopolist.
33. This stage opens up the opportunity for prospective merger partners to assert the
"countervailing efficiencies defense": that efficiency gains resulting from the merger out-
weigh any possible anticompetitive effects. This defense is rarely successful. See infra
notes 35-39 and accompanying text. The Guidelines also require that any efficiency gains
to be considered in favor of the proposed merger could not be achieved by the parties
by any other means. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 12, § 4, at 41,562.
34. See id. § 5, at 41,562-63.
35. See Donald I. Baker & William Blumenthal, The 1982 Guidelines and Preexisting
Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 311, 322 (1983); Jonathan B. Baker, The Antitrust Analysis of
Hospital Mergers and the Transfonnation of the Hospital Industry, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1988, at 93, 119; James A. Keyte, Market Definition and Differentiated
Products: The Need for a Workable Standard, 63 ANTrrRUST LJ. 697, 697 (1995); see,
e.g., Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995)
("Without a definition of the relevant market, it is impossible to determine market
share."); Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 485, 505 (E.D. Pa.
1980), rev'd on other grounds, 658 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1981) ("[Mjarket definition is crucial
to determining the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a firm's market power.").
Adjudication of alleged antitrust violations can proceed without a definition of the
relevant market only where there is direct, as opposed to circumstantial, evidence of a
violation of antitrust law; such cases are rare. See, eg., E.W. French & Sons, Inc. v.
General Portland, Inc., 885 F.2d 1392, 1402-06 (9th Cir. 1989) (Farris, J., concurring).
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tervailing efficiencies.36 The availability of the efficiencies defense
is also limited by the Antitrust Division's requirement that any ef-
ficiency gains to be considered in favor of the merger be unavail-
able through any other means, 7 by many attorneys' unfamiliarity
with the defense,38 and perhaps by some reluctance of the courts
to give much weight to the efficiencies defense, even when it is
credibly argued."
B. Historical Background
1. Rise of the Cluster Market Approach. The cluster market
approach to product market definition in the antitrust analysis of
bank mergers was first outlined by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Philadelphia National Bank in 1963.4 The Court in
Philadelphia National stated that:
[T]he cluster of products (various kinds of credit) and services
(such as checking accounts and trust administration) denoted by
the term "commercial banking," .... composes a distinct line of
commerce. Some commercial banking products or services are so
distinctive that they are entirely free of effective competition
from products or services of other financial institutions; the
checking account is in this category. Others enjoy such cost ad-
vantages as to be insulated within a broad range from substitutes
furnished by other institutions.... Finally, there are banking
facilities which, although in terms of cost and price they are
freely competitive with the facilities provided by other financial
36. See Dennis A. Yao & Thomas N. Dahdouh, Information Problems in Merger
Decision Making and Their Impact On Development of an Efficiencies Defense, 62 ANTI-
TRusT IJ. 23 (1993). "[I]nformation problems ... often present major hurdles to merger
proponents presenting efficiencies claims to antitrust enforcers," and "may present major
hurdles ... in litigation as well, since case law imposes on merger proponents the bur-
den of production and persuasion of efficiencies ... ." Id. at 29 & n.19. The "conve-
nience and needs" defense provided by the federal banking laws suffers from the same
problems that have rendered the efficiencies defense impotent. See supra note 9.
37. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 12, § 0.2, at 41,554.
38. See Steve Stockum, The Efficiencies Defense for Horizontal Mergers: What Is the
Government's Standard?, 61 ANTrrRUsT L.J. 829, 829-31 (1993).
39. See id. The efficiencies defense has not sufficed to win any adjudicated case, see
id. at 829-30, and the Supreme Court has in fact never explicitly recognized the validity
of the defense. See id. at 829. Note also that not even the efficiencies defense, weak as
it is, allows anticompetitive effects in one market to be excused by efficiencies in another
market. See infra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
40. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963).
[Vol. 46:865
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institutions, nevertheless enjoy a settled consumer preference, in-
sulating them, to a marked degree, from competition... 41
The Court thus concluded that the cluster of "commercial bank-
ing" products and services was a market "sufficiently inclusive to
be meaningful in terms of trade realities,"'42 and was therefore the
relevant product market.4'
However, while the Court explained that many of the individ-
ual products of a commercial bank faced little competition at the
time, "the Court did not explain why these individual product
markets should be grouped together" in a cluster market for pur-
poses of merger review.' The specific economic rationale behind
the Court's adoption of the cluster market approach was thus left
unstated, and lower courts were left with little practical guidance
in the matter.4' As a result, "[i]nstead of invoking substantive
standards, courts have often justified cluster definitions merely by
relying on such undefined phrases as trade, commercial or eco-
nomic 'reality,"'46 or on other criteria apparently unrelated to the
question of whether or not the products and services included in
the cluster were actually a single line of commerce.47
41. Id. at 356-57.
42. Id. at 357 (quoting Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 296 F.2d
800, 811 (9th Cir. 1961)); see also United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
399 U.S. 350, 359-62 (1970) (adopting the Philadelphia National holding that "commercial
banking" composed a "distinct line of commerce" and including small banks as well as
large banks in this category) (citations omitted).
43. See Philadelphia National, 374 U.S. at 357. Three years after Philadelphia Na-
tional, the Court found another cluster market, this time in the market for accredited
central station fire and burglar alarm services. See U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,
571-73 (1966) ("lump[ing] together" markets for burglar alarm services, fire alarm ser-
vices, and other "property protection" services). The Court in Grinnell relied on the
cluster market definition in Philadelphia National, and found that a "comparable cluster
of services" constituted the market for central station alarm services. Id. at 572.
44. Ian Ayres, Note, Rationalizing Antitrust Cluster Markets, 95 YAI L.J 109, 111
(1985).
45. See id. at 112; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Nondeposit Deposits
and the Future of Bank Regulation, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 237, 265-66 (1992).
46. Ayres, supra note 44, at 110.
47. See id. at 112-13; see, eg., American Med. Int'l, Inc., [1983-1987 Transfer Binder]
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 22,170, at 23,040 (F.T.C. 1984) (approving cluster on the basis
of "functional complementarity"); United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 415 F. Supp. 637,
640-42 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (approving cluster on the basis of common constituent technolo-
gies); In re The Grand Union Co., 102 F.T.C. 812, 1046 n.31 (1983) (approving cluster
on the basis of census categories); In re Brunswick Corp., 94 F.T.C. 1174, 1258 (1979)
(approving cluster on the basis of a trade association's recognition of an overall market
that includes producers of several different products).
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The best explanation for the existence of cluster markets, and
the best justification for their use in merger review, is the theory
of transactional complementarity.48 Products are said to be
transactionally complementary if consumers usually choose to pur-
chase them together.49 If consumers do usually choose to pur-
chase the different products together, then firms supplying only
some of those products will not be able to compete effectively
with firms supplying all of those products." Competition will take
Scholars have also sometimes confused the usual definition of a product market-by
substitutability and cross-elasticity-with the definition of a cluster market, which is char-
acterized not by cross-elasticity between its constituent products (a safe deposit box, for
instance, is not a viable substitute for a checking account), but by consumer demand for
the cluster of services in toto, as opposed to demand for its constituent products sepa-
rately. See, e.g., 4 EARL W. KiTNER, FEDERAL AiNTrrRusT LAW § 37.10, at 364-67
(1984) (referring to the product markets in United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S.
441 (1964), and United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271 (1964), as cluster
markets, even though the product markets in those cases were defined by cross-elasticity,
not by transactional complementarity, see infra text accompanying notes 48-49; in Con-
tinental Can, for instance, the Court found that glass and metal containers were actively
competitive as viable substitutes for each other, see 378 U.S. at 448-57, not that consum-
ers usually chose to purchase glass containers and metal containers together).
48. For the seminal examination of transactional complementarity, see Ayres, supra
note 44.
49. Specifically, products are transactionally complementary "if buying them from a
single firm significantly reduces consumers' transaction costs," thereby causing such prod-
ucts usually to be demanded together, and excluding from the market for those products
firms that do not offer the whole group, or "cluster," of products which consumers
choose to purchase together. Ayres, supra note 44, at 114-15. The operative distinction is
between "significant" complementarity and insignificant complementarity; many consumers
choose to purchase both oranges and motor oil at their local supermarket, but because
many consumers still purchase oranges from fruit stands and motor oil from gas stations,
neither fruit stands nor gas stations are effectively foreclosed from selling those products
separately. The complementarity of those products is therefore insignificant, and aggrega-
tion of the markets for the two products into one cluster market would be inaccurate.
On the other hand, virtually all consumers choose to purchase right shoes along with left
shoes, and a firm selling only left shoes would be effectively foreclosed from competing
in the market for shoes; complementarity between those two products is thus highly
significant, and the two products are correctly analyzed as constituents of the same clus-
ter market.
Notice that transactionally complementary products are defined as such on the basis
of forces aggregating demand for those products; this is in contrast to tied goods, which
are defined as such on the basis of forces aggregating supply of those products. The
inquiry into whether products are transactionally complementary is thus the demand-side
analogue to the inquiry, sometimes undertaken in tying cases, into whether the allegedly
tied products are in fact separate products or are instead a single product. See, e.g., Unit-
ed States v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 559 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd per curiam,
365 U.S. 567 (1961).
50. See Ayres, supra note 44, at 115; see also Peter Bronsteen, Product Market Def-
nition in Commercial Bank Merger Cases, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 677, 681-83 (1985) (defin-
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place only among those firms that supply the whole group, or
"cluster," of products."' In such a scenario, a court analyzing this
ing cluster markets as markets for "commodity bundles ... that are purchased jointly"
and noting that a central attribute of such bundles is that "consumers react to a price in-
crease for one or more items in the bundle as a price increase for the entire bundle"-a
condition that the traditional banking cluster market may have met in 1963 but which it
does not meet today).
Some commentators argue that supply-side economies of scope may also lead to
clustering if the cost advantages of producing an entire set of products, rather than only
some of those products, are significant enough to provide producers of the entire cluster
market power over partial producers. See Gregory E. Elliehausen & John D. Wolken,
Small Business Clustering of Fmancial Services and the Definition of Banking Markets for
Antitrust Analysis, 37 ANTrrRuSr BULL. 707, 712 (1992). However, "while transactional
complementarity necessitates joint purchase, economies of scope do not necessitate joint
sale." Ayres, supra note 44, at 116. Thus, barring some separate exercise of market pow-
er, economies of scope could lead to clustering only if the producers of the entire cluster
thereby are able to offer lower prices than partial producers or are able to lower
purchasers' transaction costs; thus, even this form of clustering ultimately depends on
consumers' choices to purchase the relevant products together rather than separately. In
any case, economies of scope do not appear to be the cause of clustering in the banking
industry. See Elliehausen & Wolken, supra, at 713.
Other commentators refer to cluster markets defined on the basis of "consumption
complementarity." See, e-g., Roger D. Blair & James A. Burt, Leveraging Monopoly Pow-
er Through Hospital Diversification, I STAN. J.L. Bus. & FiN. 287, 294 nA0 (1995). That
many consumers choose to consume two goods together, however, does not necessarily
mean that those consumers will choose to purchase the two products together, or that
firms producing one of the two goods will be unable effectively to compete with firms
producing both of the two goods. Many consumers choose to consume potato chips to-
gether with cheese dip (and many supermarkets choose to carry both products), but
many firms continue to produce only chips or only dip. Aggregation of the markets for
the two products into one cluster market would thus be incorrect.
51. The cluster of products then functions as a single product for purposes of general
product market definition; once the cluster has been defined, the court should then in-
quire into whether there are effective substitutes for the cluster as a whole, and then
include both the cluster and any possible substitutes for it in the product market for
purposes of antitrust analysis. However, because cluster markets often serve a relatively
broad congeries of consumer demands, any effective substitute would very likely have to
be a cluster itself, and in order to serve the same set of demands as the original cluster,
a provider would very likely have to provide an aggregation of products so similar to the
original cluster as to warrant treatment, not as a substitute, but as merely another in-
stance of the same cluster.
One commentator has argued that complementarity of products (whether supply or
demand complementarity) should not be considered in market definition, but should be
addressed after market definition, as a factor which facilitates or frustrates collusion (such
as ease of entry). See Baker, supra note 35, at 129-40. Baker errs, however, in treating
market definitions based on complementarity primarily as an alternative to market defini-
tion based on substitutability, rather than as a method for determining what "product"
will be subject to substitutability analysis. The question is not whether "markets based on
substitutability are to be preferred to the cluster based on complementarity," id. at 137,
but whether substitutability analysis must be applied to one product or to a cluster of
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market for antitrust review purposes should cluster the submarkets
for the transactionally complementary products together, so as to
recognize not only ongoing competition among firms supplying the
entire cluster, but also the exclusion from competition of those
firms attempting to provide only part of the cluster." Only by
clustering markets for transactionally complementary products can
a court recognize competition where it in fact exists,53 and also
recognize its absence where it is in fact absent.
The Court's cluster market definition in Philadelphia National
was intended to reflect competitive conditions in the banking in-
dustry of 1963 and to acknowledge the extent to which the market
for banking products and services was constrained-and protect-
ed-by regulation of the industry.' That industry was predomi-
nantly one of "unit banking," in which most banks maintained
only one office, with limited branching.55 The industry operated
within a strict regulatory framework which effectively prohibited
interstate banking.56 Banks were prohibited from providing non-
banking products and services,5 7 and non-banks were prohibited
products.
52. See Ayres, supra note 44, at 117.
53. See generally Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 326 (stating that the
relevant market must be defined with sufficient accuracy to recognize competition where
it actually exists).
54. See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, THE REGULATION OF BANKING 306 (1992).
55. Only 17.3% of banks in 1960 operated branches. See MACEY & MILLER, supra
note 10, at 26. By 1979, 44.7% of banks did so. See id. In 1960, the country's 13,999
banks operated 11,106 branches. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CEN-
SUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1980, at 531 tbl. 873. By 1990,
12,819 banks operated 54,126 branches. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACt OF THE UNITED STATES 1992, at 495 tbl. 774.
Intrastate branching was limited, and in some states continues to be limited, by
state legislation applied to national banks through the McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36(c)
(1994). The McFadden Act also generally prohibited interstate branching by national
banks, see id., and by state-chartered member banks, see 12 U.S.C. § 321.
56. Interstate banking by bank holding companies' acquisition of banks in states oth-
er than home states was prohibited by the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding
Company Act, unless the acquired bank's state legislature had explicitly authorized such
an acquisition. See MACEY & MMLER, supra note 10, at 26-27. This prohibition has since
been effectively repealed. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
57. Specifically, banks are allowed to carry on only banking activities (as listed in
the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1994)), and those incidental activities "necessary
to carry on the business of banking." Id. Among the activities that have been found to
be prohibited to banks and bank holding companies are the provision of full-scale travel
agency services, see Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1972); retail sales
data processing, see Nat'l Retailers Corp. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 411 F. Supp 308 (D.
Ariz. 1976), affd, 604 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1979); insurance agency activities in communities
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from offering many banking products and services. 8 Non-bank
firms, such as thrifts, finance companies, credit card companies,
and insurance companies 9 had barely begun to enter markets for
some banking products and services, and "the perception persisted
that a commercial bank was a unique, full-service institution,
somehow insulated from the serious competition of [its] non-bank
rivals."' ° In short, it was an industry whose products and services
were treated as a group by law and regulation, and as a cluster by
consumers.
Changes in the industry proceeded apace, however, and ten
years later, while upholding the cluster market approach in anoth-
er bank merger case, the Court felt constrained to add a signifi-
cant qualification. In United States v. Connecticut National Bank,6'
the Court stated that thrifts and commercial banks were "direct
competitors in some submarkets," 62 and "fierce competitors" at
that.' The Court nonetheless upheld the cluster market approach,
but did so only after acknowledging that the differences between
over 5,000 people, see Saxon v. Georgia Assoc. of Indep. Ins. Agents, 399 F2d 1010 (5th
Cir. 1968), but see First Union Banks, Establishment of Operating Subsidiaries to Engage
in Insurance Agency Activities, OCC Letter 96-ML-08-09-015 (1996) (on file with au-
thor) (allowing national bank to engage in insurance sales nationwide, and requiring only
technical agency functions to be performed in small towns); and the pledging of bank
assets to secure deposits, see Yonkers v. Downey, 309 U.S. 590 (1940).
National banks and state member banks are also prohibited from underwriting,
selling, and dealing in securities by the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 335; banks
are also prohibited from affiliation within a bank holding company with firms "engaged
principally" in dealings in securities, see 12 U.S.C. § 377. State non-member banks' secu-
rities activities are regulated by the FDIC, 12 C.F.R. § 337.4(b), (c) (1996). Changes in
the industry in the 1970s and 1980s significantly weakened the import of these prohibi-
tions. See infra Section I.B.2. However, the trend had not yet begun to accelerate in
1963. See MELANI L. FEiN, SECURITIES AcrivrrIs OF BANKS, 1-14 to 1-18.2 (1991)
(listing significant agency decisions loosening regulation under the Glass-Steagall Act).
58. For instance, banks held a legal monopoly over the market for both individual
and commercial checking accounts, see United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321, 326 (1963), and thrifts were largely prohibited from offering commercial and real
estate loans. See MAcEY & MILLPE, supra note 10, at 468.
59. In this Note, firms which provide some but not all of the products and services
in the traditional banking cluster are referred to as "partial providers."
60. Eugene M. Katz, Determination of Line of Commerce for Bank Mergers: A Con-
temporary View, 5 J.L. & COM. 155, 160 (1985). In the early and mid-1960s, non-bank
partial providers in general were just beginning to make inroads into commercial banks'
traditional lines of business. See Shaffer, supra note 1, at 20 (describing increased com-
petitive pressure on banks after 1966).
61. 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
62. Id. at 663 n.3.
63. Id. at 662.
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the cluster of products and services offered by banks and those
offered by thrifts and other partial providers were "perhaps not as
sharply defined" as they had been ten years prior, in Philadelphia
National.64 The Court went on to say that Philadelphia National
did not hold that
[A] court may never consider savings banks and commercial
banks as operating in the same line of commerce, no matter how
similar their services and economic behavior. At some stage in
the development of savings banks it will be unrealistic to distin-
guish them from commercial banks for purposes of the Clayton
Act.... [But] we hold that such a point has not yet been
reached6s
The Court has not revisited the issue to determine if that
point has been reached in the quarter-century since Connecticut
National was decided. Even though revolutionary changes have
shaken the banking industry to the core,:6 even though banks
now face competition in virtually every submarket from non-bank
partial providers,67 and even though the legal and regulatory
framework insulating banks from that competition has been largely
dismantled,' no Supreme Court case-and only one federal ap-
64. Id. at 663.
65. Id. at 666.
66. See generally ROBERT E. LrAN, THE REVOLUTION IN U.S. FINANCE (1991) (dis-
cussing the causes and possible implications of a large-scale shifting of Americans' wealth
from traditional banks and savings and loans to other financial intermediaries such as
mutual funds); see also MACEY & MILLER, supra note 10, at 467-68 (questioning whether
the passage of the Gan-St. Germain Act of 1982 might be "enough to boost thrifts over
the Connecticut National threshold for the banking line of commerce").
67. See Robert E. Hauberg, Jr., Mergers and Acquisitions: Trends in Competitive
Analysis, BANKING EXPANSION REP., July 6, 1987, at 1 (describing how increased compe-
tition has altered the government's analysis of mergers); Eugene A. Ludwig, Antitrust and
Banking, 49 ANTITRUST BULL 475, 476 (1996). Ludwig, the current Comptroller of the
Currency, notes:
Unlike 35 years ago, there are now nonbank competitors for nearly all commer-
cial bank services. Today, it is hard to identify market segments where banks
maintain a clear competitive advantage, except perhaps in small business lend-
ing-in the form of lower information costs ... and in retail deposits ... in
the form of federal deposit insurance. And the latter advantage is shared by
other depository institutions. Indeed, one could argue that only bank
innovativeness in entering new markets such as those for derivatives and various
financial guarantees such as standby letters of credit has allowed them to re-
main major players in financial markets.
Id.
68. See infra Section I.B.2; see also MACEY & MILLER, supra note 10, at 467-69
(listing legislative changes since Philadelphia National).
IM] ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF BANK MERGERS 879
pellate case69-has considered whether or not Philadelphia
National's cluster market approach still "recognize[s] competition
where, in fact, competition exists."7
2. Structural and Legal Changes in the Banking Industry Since
Philadelphia National. In the contemporary banking industry, the
cluster market method is inaccurate; banks still dominate markets
for some of the products and services in the traditional cluster, but
thrifts and non-depository partial providers have made significant
inroads into other markets. As noted above, the most prominent
trend in the banking industry over the past two decades has been
consolidation. In the past decade alone, the number of federally-
insured banking organizations declined more than 30%." Banking
institutions tended to grow larger over the same period,'2 and de-
posits became more concentrated in the largest institutions.7 3 This
consolidation has occurred largely in response to other changes in
the banking industry, both structural and legal, which have
increased competition in the industry and have forced banks to
pursue greater efficiency.
Since the 1970s, banks' profit margins have been squeezed by
several structural trends in the industry: disintermediation, global-
ization, and increased competition from thrifts and other partial
providers.74 Banks have been dislodged from their historic role as
the predominant financial intermediaries in the U.S. financial sys-
tem, as depositors have moved their funds to money market funds,
mutual and pension funds, and other depository institutions such
as thrifts and credit unions!' Large banks have also faced in-
69. A 1985 case in the Sixth Circuit, in which the court held, without significant
comment, that the lower court's use of the cluster market method to analyze the acquisi-
tion at issue was not "clearly erroneous," is the only reported appellate case on point
since Connecticut National. See United States v. Central State Bank, 817 F2d 22, 24 (6th
Cir. 1985) aff'g United States v. Central State Bank, 621 F. Supp. 1276, 1291 (W.D.
Mich. 1985) (finding -that the relevant product market . . . is the cluster of products and
services offered by commercial banks").
70. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 326 (1962).
71. See Amel, supra note 1, at 5. Only a few non-federally-insured institutions contin-
ue to operate in the U.S., and their presence does not affect the overall trend toward
consolidation. See id. at 1.
72. The market share of institutions controlling more than five billion dollars in
deposits rose from 30% to over 50%. See id. at 6.
73. The share of deposits held by the top 1% of institutions, measured by size, rose
from 522% to 61.1%. See id. at 9.
74. See LrrAN, supra note 66, at 6-23.
75. See id. at 9-12; see also ALBERT M. WOMNILOWER, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
creased competition from foreign banks, as the financial services
industry has undergone the same globalization as many other in-
dustries. 6 Finally, banks have also faced increased competition in
lending markets from thrifts' and other lenders, such as finance
companies,7 8 and from the ongoing process of securitization of
debt through commercial paper, mortgage-backed securities, and
other debt securities.79
The increased competition which banks now face from thrifts
and other partial providers0 has largely resulted from changes in
the legal framework that formerly protected banks from competi-
tion in markets for many of the products and services included in
the banking cluster market by the Philadelphia National Court."
Banks' former legal monopoly over the market for checking ac-
counts, the Philadelphia National Court's archetypal "banking
product,"' was effectively broken by the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA),83
CANNOT COMPETE 4-5 (1990) (describing how relative freedom from government regula-
tions made money markets attractive to investors).
76. See LrrAN, supra note 66, at 19-20. In the 1980s, foreign lending as a percent of
total business lending in the U.S. rose from 15% to almost 30%. See id. at 20.
77. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 10, at 467-68 (recalling the Connecticut Na-
tional Court's statement that thrifts did "not yet" warrant inclusion in the same product
market as banks, and asking, "if not now, when?").
78. See LrrAN, supra note 66, at 18 (noting the increase in competition from finance
companies).
79. See iL at 12-17. Banks have in turn capitalized on the new trend toward securi-
tization by backing commercial paper issuers with standby letters of credit, but banks'
margins on these instruments are significantly less than those on the lending business
they have lost in the process. See id. at 17.
80. Competition from thrifts has waned in the last few years with the collapse of the
thrift industry. See Rebel A. Cole et al., Bank and Nonbank Competition for Small Busi-
ness Credit: Evidence from the 1987 and 1993 National Surveys of Small Business Financ-
es, 82 FED. REs. BULL 983, 984 (1996) (noting that thrifts lost almost half of their dol-
lar share of the small business lending market between 1987 and 1993-but that the lost
market share primarily accrued to other non-bank providers). The thrifts that remain,
however, continue to represent significant competition. See infra notes 141-46 and accom-
panying text. Moreover, competition from credit unions and other partial providers has
increased over the past decade, see Cole et al., supra, at 984, largely as a result of favor-
able administrative rulings. See Amel, supra note 1, at 4.
81. The Court relied heavily upon this protectional framework in defining the cluster
market in Philadelphia National: "Commercial banks.., alone are permitted by law to
accept demand deposits." United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 326
(1963). Checking accounts were thus "entirely free of effective competition from products
or services of other financial institutions." Id. at 356.
82. Id.
83. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
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which authorized thrifts to offer negotiable order of withdrawal
(NOW) accounts.8' The Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions
Act of 198285 allowed thrifts to offer money-market accounts86
and to enter the markets for commercial lending and nonresiden-
tial real estate lending. 7 The Competitive Equality Banking Act
of 19878 lifted limits on thrifts' interstate expansion, 9 and al-
lowed thrift holding companies to engage in activities formerly
reserved to bank holding companies. 9 The Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)9'
then authorized bank holding companies to acquire thrifts,92 and
authorized thrifts to convert to commercial banks or merge with
commercial banks,93 thereby escaping the thrift-specific regulatory
requirements which remain.
Deregulation has also intensified competition within the bank-
ing industry.94 The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking Act of 1994
opened up local banking markets to competition from institutions
headquartered all over the country,95 increasing intra-industry
U.S.C.).
84. 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (1994). However, thrifts may only offer individual (i.e., non-
commercial) NOW accounts. See id. § 1832(a)(2).
85. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.).
86. See 12 U.S.C. § 3503 (1988) (omitted in 1994 U.S.C.).
87. See 12 U.S.C § 1464(c)(1) (1994).
88. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C. (1988) (repealed 1989)).
89. See 12 U.S.C. § 1730 (1988) (repealed 1989).
90. See id. § 1730 a(c)(2).
91. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.).
92. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(i) (1994).
93. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1815(d)(2)(G), 1815(d)(3) (1994). Thrifts are required to meet a
number of capital and other requirements before conversion (often referred to as "Sasser
conversions," after the provision's sponsor) or merger (often referred to as "Oakar con-
versions"). FISHER, supra note 17, § 3.12.1, at 3:97 nn.25-26. These requirements likely
lessen somewhat the competitive impact of the conversion provisions on existing banks.
However, a number of thrifts have successfully converted. See id.
Deregulation of the thrift industry has also generally accelerated the removal of
regulatory limitations on commercial banks' opportunities for expansion and consolidation.
See Lissa Lamkin Broome, The Influence of Enhanced Thrift Institution Powers on Com-
mercial Bank Expansion, 67 N.C. L. REV. 795, 808-50 (1989).
94. See Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank Regula-
tion In a Deregulatory Age, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 501, 502 (1989) ("[L]arge portions of
traditional bank regulation, including the twin pillars of geographic and product restric-
tions, are crumbling rapidly." (citations omitted)).
95. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(d) (1994). The passage of the Riegle-Neal Act was the capstone
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competition. Some bank product lines, such as credit cards, already
face nationwide competition. 6 Other submarkets, such as trans-
action accounts, have been specifically affected by legal changes
such as those included in DIDMCA, which authorized the pay-
ment of interest on checking accounts, opening that submarket to
more intense competition. 7 The submarket for commercial lend-
ing to larger borrowers has been affected by increased securitiza-
tion of debt, as noted above, and by court decisions allowing bank
holding companies to engage in the securitized-debt markets them-
selves.98 In short, banks now face different levels of competition
in different product lines; the traditional banking cluster market is
fragmented.
3. The Antitrust Division's Abandonment of the Cluster
Market Approach. In 1990, the Antitrust Division abandoned the
cluster market method of product market definition in its review
of bank mergers, and instituted a method of disaggregation of the
traditional cluster market into smaller submarkets for specific
products and services, with special emphasis on the market for
commercial loans to small and medium-sized businesses." The Di-
of a long process whereby institutions had avoided the Douglas Amendment's restrictions
on interstate banking through the vehicle of the "non-bank bank" and states had avoided
those restrictions through mutual interstate banking compacts. See Michael P. Malloy,
Nonbanks and Nondefiitions: New Challenges in Bank Regulatory Policy, 10 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 3-5 (1986); see also MACEY & MILLER, supra note 10, at 32-33 (not-
ing the rise of "regional banking compacts" in the 1980s).
96. See, eg., Dennis W. Carlton & Alan S. Frankel, The Antitrust Economics of
Credit Card Networks, 63 ANTIRUST LJ. 643, 652-54 (1994) (noting the response of
hundreds of issuers nationwide to AT&T's introduction of a no-annual-fee Universal
Card).
97. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L
No. 96-221 § 207(b)(2), (3), 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.); see also MACEY & MILLER, supra note 10, at 31 (describing DIDMCA's place
in the general deregulation of interest rates).
98. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.
(Bankers Trust II), 807 F.2d 1052, 1069-70 (D.C. Cir 1986) (holding that private offering
of commercial paper does not constitute "underwriting" as proscribed by the Glass-
Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (1994)); Securities Indus. Ass'n. v. Board of Gover-
nors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Bankers Trust III), 839 F.2d 47, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1988)
(holding that non-bank subsidiaries of bank holding companies may engage in bank-ineli-
gible securities activities so long as revenues from those activities do not exceed 5% to
10% of the subsidiary's gross revenue).
99. See Katz, supra note 60, at 168-72. The Antitrust Division took this step in 1990
after several previous cases in which it had modified the traditional cluster market ap-
proach in one way or another, without explicitly disclaiming that approach. See id
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vision debuted its new method in its first attempt to enjoin a bank
merger in seven years, arguing that a proposed merger between
First Hawaiian Inc. and First Interstate of Hawaii would sub-
stantially lessen competition in the market for commercial loans to
small and medium-sized businesses in Hawaii."° The Division en-
tered its challenge after the Fed had already approved the acqui-
sition under the cluster market approach.'' The Division re-
quired substantial divestitures as cure for the potential anti-
competitive effects of the merger.' Since First Hawaiian, the
Division has challenged, or threatened to challenge, numerous
prospective bank mergers under its new disaggregated submarket
analysis.cn
The Fed, meanwhile, has resolutely maintained its use of the
cluster market method of analysis."t 4 Thus the two agencies with
primary responsibility for antitrust review of bank mergers are
currently utilizing two very different methods of product market
definition; as would be expected, the result in several cases has
been approval of a proposed merger by the Fed, and a subsequent
challenge of the same merger by the Antitrust Division. 5
100. See Katz, supra note 20, at 4; Proposed Final Judgment, Stipulation, and Compet-
itive Impact Statement, First Hawaiian, Inc., and First Interstate of Hawaii, Inc., 56 FED.
REG. 10,916, 10,922-23 (1991) [hereinafter First Hawaiian, Proposed Final Judgment].
101. See First Hawaiian, Proposed Final Judgment, supra note 100, at 10,922; Order
Approving the Acquisition of a Bank Holding Company, (First Hawaiian, Inc.), 77 FED.
RES. BULL 52, 53 (1991); Katz, supra note 20, at 4, 7.
102. See First Hawaiian, Proposed Final Judgment, supra note 100, at 10,924.
103. See, eg., Proposed Final Judgment, Stipulation, and Competitive Impact State-
ment, U.S. v. Fleet/Norstar Financial Group, Inc., 56 FED. REG. 33,458 (1991) [hereinafter
Fleet/Norstar, Proposed Final Judgment]; Proposed Final Judgment, Stipulation, and Com-
petitive Impact Statement, U.S. v. Society Corp. and Ameritrust Corp., 57 FED. REG.
10,371 (1992) [hereinafter Society Corp, Proposed Final Judgment]; see also Margaret E.
Guerin-Calvert, Current Merger Policy: Banking and ATM Network Mergers, 49 ANTr-
TRUST BULL 289, 301 (1996) (listing resolutions of antitrust reviews of major bank merg-
ers since 1990).
104. See Order Approving the Acquisition of a Bank Holding Company (First Hawai-
ian), supra note 101, at 53; FISHER, supra note 17, § 3.12, at 3:89.
105. See, eg., First Hawaiian, Proposed Final Judgment, supra note 100 at 10,922;
Society Corp., Proposed Final Judgment, supra note 103 at 10,379 (DOJ challenge of
merger after approval by Fed); Fleet/Norstar, Proposed Final Judgment, supra note 103,
at 33,464 (same); Proposed Final Judgment, Stipulation, and Competitive Impact State-
ment, U.S. v. Texas Commerce Bancshares, Inc. and Texas Commerce Bank-Midland,
N.A., 58 FED. REG. 15,361, 15,372 (1993) (DOJ challenge after approval by OCC).
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II. COMPARISON AND CRITICISM OF THE TWO METHODS
A. The Bank Merger Review Process
The Antitrust Division receives hundreds of bank merger
referrals yearly. To facilitate review of the proposed mergers, the
Division uses a three-tiered review process. 6 The first tier,
called Screen A, is intended to screen from further review those
proposed mergers which will clearly not have any significant
anticompetitive effects. Screen A calculates and compares the pre-
and post-merger Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (Bi)14 7 values for
the local geographic market, using deposits as a proxy for an
institution's competitive strength,' and using the geographic
market as defined by the Fed. 9 For purposes of the Antitrust
106. See Greenspan, supra note 10, at 17; Litan, supra note 10; Bank Merger Com-
petitive Analysis Screening Process, OCC Advisory Letter 95-4, 1995 WL 444957, at *1-
*2 [hereinafter OCC Screening Letter].
107. The HI value of a particular market is calculated by summing the squares of
the individual market shares of all firms in the market. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra
note 12, § 1.5, at 41,557-58.
For example, a market consisting of four firms with market shares of 30%,
30%, 20% and 20% has an HI of 2600 (302 + 301 + 20' + 20' = 2600). The
HH ranges from 10,000 (in the case of a pure monopoly) to a number ap-
proaching zero (in the case of an atomistic market). Although it is desirable to
include all firms in the calculation, lack of information about small firms is not
critical because such firms do not affect the HHI significantly.
See idU § 1.5 n.17. When reviewing mergers in industries other than banking, the Antitrust
Division is unlikely to challenge mergers resulting in a post-merger HHI in the relevant
market of less than 1000, or a post-merger Hill of between 1000 and 1800, if the change
in H-ll caused by the merger is less than 100 index points. Id. § 1.51. Mergers resulting
in a post-merger iH value between 1000 and 1800 and causing an increase of more
than 100 index points will "raise significant competitive concerns" at the Division, and
will be subject to further scrutiny; the same is true of mergers resulting in a post-merger
Hi above 1800 and an increase of 50 or more index points. Id. The threshold at which
the Division will find "significant competitive concerns" differs when the merger under
review is a bank merger. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
108. Aggregate deposits from individuals, partnerships, and corporations ("IPC depos-
its") are the usual measure of deposits. See FISHER, supra note 17, § 3.7, at 3:54.
Note that the use of deposits as a proxy automatically excludes from consideration
in this stage of review all partial providers who do not accept deposits, including finance
companies, credit card companies, and so on. See infra notes 165-66 and accompanying
text. The use of depository HI also overlooks the importance of "nondeposit deposits"
(instruments which perform the traditional functions of checking account deposits but
which are structured so as to avoid federal regulation) and of the differences in distribu-
tion of these instruments between banks. See Macey & Miller, supra note 45, at 265.
Finally, the use of depository EHI measures has the potential to hide monopsonistic
behavior in the purchase of deposits, as well as the potential monopolistic anticompetitive
behavior in the extension of credit which is the primary concern of the Antitrust Divi-
sion. See Bronsteen, supra note 50, at 689-94.
109. See OCC Screening Letter, supra note 106, at *2-3, *5. If no Federal Reserve
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Division's HI screening analysis, thrift deposits are either wholly
excluded from the HI calculation, if the ratio of the bank's total
commercial and industrial (C&I) loans to its total assets is less
than 2%, or are included at 100% of their actual value, if the
C&I loans-to-assets ratio is greater than 2%.11 In order to fail
Screen A, the post-merger H=i value must exceed 1800 index
points, and the increase from the pre-merger value to the post-
merger value must exceed 200 points."'
The second tier of review, called Screen B," is much more
stringent. It excludes thrift deposits from consideration entirely and
utilizes smaller geographic markets if appropriate;" HIM calcula-
tions are then performed on the smaller market. The exclusion of
thrift deposits from consideration and the use of a smaller geo-
graphic market makes it more likely that a proposed merger will
exhibit anticompetitive effects under the Screen B analysis. The
Antitrust Division uses Screen A in all cases, and uses Screen B in
most cases where the proposed merger is expected to fail Screen B
with regard to any geographic market, or where the proposed
merger might fail Screen A but for the effect on the HI calcula-
tion of the inclusion of thrifts' deposits."4
If a proposed merger fails either or both of the two screens,
then it is subject to deeper, disaggregated submarket analysis by
the Division."' The use of aggregate depository HI- analysis is
market exists, Ranally Metropolitan Areas (RMAs) or counties are used in its place. See
id. at *5.
110. See David S. Neill, New Antitrust Policies Add Complexity and Uncertainty to
Bank Mergers, 17 BANK AND CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REP. 196, 196 (1996). This 2%
test is also applied to banks, see id. at 196, but few banks would be expected to fail the
test.
111. See Greenspan, supra note 10, at 17; Litan, supra note 10. Note that this test
(often referred to as the "Brookhaven test," after the case in which it first appeared, see
FiSHER, supra note 17, § 3.7, at 3:56) is nominally more lenient than that imposed on
mergers in other industries, where a merger will fail an HHI screening test if post-merger
HHI is over 1800 and the increase is over 50 points, or if the post-merger Hi is be-
tween 1100 and 1800, and the increase is over 200 points. See supra note 107.
112. See Greenspan, supra note 10, at 17.
113. See OCC Screening Letter, supra note 106, at *1. These smaller geographic areas
usually correspond with Ranafly Metropolitan Areas in urban areas, and with counties in
rural areas. See Greenspan, supra note 10, at 17.
114. See Greenspan, supra note 10, at 17.
115. The Antitrust Division may also subject a merger to deeper analysis if it involves
two of the three largest banks in the market, if the merger receives substantial press
coverage, or if the Division receives a credible protest from third parties. See SECTbON
OF ANTTRuST LAW, AMERICAN BAR Assoc., ANNUAL REVIEW OF 1994 ANTirRUST
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supplemented at this stage by the use of output-based analyses of
specific product markets, with special attention being paid to the
market for loans to small and medium-sized businesses. 6 At this
stage of merger review, the Division will also consider potential
entry into the market by new competitors in response to any price
increase, and may consider the competition of thrifts that do offer
commercial loans.'" The Division will challenge a merger if anal-
ysis at this stage reveals the potential for significant anticompeti-
tive effects in any product market."' The initial screens, while
important, are thus not fatal to a proposed transaction, as the Div-
ision often approves a transaction that fails one or both of the
screening tests." 9
The Fed's merger review process is shorter than that of the
Antitrust Division; the Fed uses the same Screen A as the Divi-
sion, but does not use Screen B.' ° The Fed usually weights
thrifts' deposits more heavily than the Division, regularly including
them in the depository HHI calculation in Screen A at 50%, and
occasionally at weights as high as 75% or 100%, of their actual
value.' The level of discounting is sometimes determined by a
C&I loans-to-asset ratio test; the deposits of thrifts with C&I
loans-to-assets ratios of 0% to 3% are weighted at 50% of their
actual value, the deposits of thrifts with C&I loans-to-assets ratios
LAW DEVELOPmENIS 281 (James A. Wilson et al. eds., 1995).
116. See Litan, supra note 10. The Antitrust Division's concerns regarding mergers'
effects on the market for loans to middle-market customers have heightened recently. See
Neill, supra note 110, at 199. With regard to the markets for lending to small and medi-
um-sized businesses, the Antitrust Division has also indicated that it may in some cases
be concerned about potential anticompetitive effects of prospective mergers in "tiered"
lending markets, that is, lending markets in which there are "one or two dominant firms
and a fringe of small independent banks which may not be able to compete significant-
ly." Id. at 198 (citation omitted). However, as Neill notes, the HHI itself is designed to
accurately reflect market tiering, and thus the rationale behind imposing an additional,
undefined market structure test is unclear, ld.
117. See Greenspan, supra note 10, at 17; Margaret E. Guerin-Calvert & Janusz A.
Ordover, The 1992 Agency Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the Department of Justice's
Approach to Bank Merger Analysis, 37 ANTIrRUST BULL. 667, 679-80 (1992).
118. See Litan, supra note 10.
119. See it
120. Greenspan, supra note 10, at 17. The OCC does the same. See OCC Screening
Letter, supra note 106, at *2.
121. Se4 e.g., Country Bank Shares Corp., 83 FED. REs. BULL 112 n.3 (1997) (weigh-
ing thrifts' deposits at 50%); First Union Corp., 81 FED. Rns. BULL. 1118, 1119 n.9
(1995) (50%); NationsBank Corp., 79 FED. RES. BULL 969, 970 (1993) (50%); Centura
Banks, Inc., 76 FED. REs. BULL 869, 870 n.11 (1990) (75%); BanPonce Corp., 77 FED.
RES. BULL 43, 44 n.9 (1991) (100%).
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from 3% to 6% are weighted at 75%, and the deposits of thrifts
with C&I loans-to-assets ratios above 6% are included at 100% of
their actual value." The OCC and the FDIC discount thrifts'
competitive effects even less than the Fed, usually including them
in the HH screening calculation at 100% of their actual value."
The Fed will carry out a deeper, case-specific analysis if the pro-
posed merger fails Screen A alone."
B. The Disaggregated Submarket Analysis
The Division's disaggregation of the traditional cluster of
banking products and services into its constituent submarkets for
purposes of merger review is supported by theory and by empirical
evidence."2 The cluster market method of product market defini-
122. See Neill, supra note 110, at 196. Where a bank and a thrift merge under the
merger and conversion provision of 12 U.S.C. § 1815(d)(3), the Fed includes the deposits
of the thrift being converted at 100% of their actual value, because those deposits will
become bank deposits through the merger, and includes the deposits of other thrifts in
the market at a lesser weight. See eg., Huntington Bancshares Inc., 81 FED. RES. BULL
47, 48 n.4 (1995); Norwest Corp., 78 FED. RES. BULL 452, 452 n.5 (1992).
123. See FISHER, supra note 17, § 3.12.1, at 3:91-92.
124. Unlike the Antitrust Division, the Fed will carry out this case-specific detailed
analysis using the cluster market method of product market definition. See id. § 3.12. The
Federal Reserve has recently shown willingness to consider the market for small business
lending in addition to the traditional cluster market at this stage; however, no policy
change has been made. See infra note 169.
125. In addition to focusing on the submarket for small business lending, the Antitrust
Division is also sometimes concerned with the submarket for small business transaction
(i.e., checking) accounts. See, eg., First Hawaiian, Proposed Final Judgment, supra note
100, at 10,922; United States v. Central State Bank, 817 F.2d 22, 23 (1987). The
Division's case with regard to disaggregation of this submarket is also strong. Most of the
following theoretical and empirical arguments in favor of disaggregation of the submarket
for small business lending apply with similar force to the controversy over disaggregation
of the market for small business transaction accounts. The market for small business
transaction accounts is dominated by commercial banks; 86% of small businesses maintain
liquid asset accounts (i.e., either checking or savings accounts) at commercial banks, while
only 16% maintain such accounts at any non-bank provider. See Rebel A. Cole & John
D. Wolken, Financial Services Used by Small Businesses: Evidence from the 1993 National
Survey of Small Business Finances, 81 FED. RES. BuLL. 629, 656-58 tbl. AA (1995). The
market is also overwhelmingly local; 95.7% of small businesses maintain checking ac-
counts at local institutions. See Gregory E. Elliehausen & John D. Wolken, Banking
Markets and the Use of Financial Services by Small and Medium-Sized Businesses, 76
FED. RES. BULL. 801, 809 tbl. 6 (1990). Moreover, small business transaction accounts are
legally still the exclusive domain of commercial banks. See 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(2) (1988)
(authorizing thrifts to provide individual, but not commercial, transaction accounts). Clus-
tering of this submarket with other, less-concentrated submarkets thus holds heightened
potential to mask anticompetitive effects in this market.
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tion obfuscates the partial, submarket nature of partial providers'
competition with commercial banks. The use of the cluster market
method thus creates the possibility that merger review authorities
might overlook significant concentrations in particular product lines
and particular geographic areas, and that significant anticompetitive
effects could follow, if certain banks were to merge without strate-
gic divestitures." In the contemporary environment, approxi-
mation by aggregation may mask significant concentrations in
bank-dominated product markets by conflating them with relatively
diluted concentrations in product markets in which non-depository
partial providers are significant competitors.1" The cluster market
126. See Bronsteen, supra note 50, at 686-87 (arguing that cluster approach should be
abandoned); Note, The Line of Commerce for Commercial Bank Mergers: A Product-
Oriented Redeftnition, 96 HARV. L. REv. 907, 907-08 (1983) (noting that cluster approach
fails to recognize a merger's effect on competition in specific product lines).
127. See Bronsteen, supra note 50, at 686-87. To see this effect, consider the follow-
ing example. In the first scenario, markets for all products in the traditional banking
cluster of products are dominated by commercial banks:
Banking market, ca. 1963
All product markets bank-dominated
Product: A B C D
20 25 20 45
Firms' 20 25 20 20
Market 20 25 20 15
Shares 20 25 20 15
20 20
HHpmd 2000 2500 2000 2875
HHId 2344
In the next scenario, some submarkets are still dominated by commercial banks,
but partial providers have garnered significant market shares in other product submarkets:
Banking market, ca. 1996
Bank-dominated Non-bank-dominated
Product A B C D
50 60 10 5
Firms' 30 20 10 5




HIw t  3800 4000 1000 500
HIteust" 2325
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method's potential to mask anticompetitive effects is exacerbated
by its effect on geographic market definition. Because the cluster
market method requires the aggregation into a single market of
products that often are subject to competition from varying geo-
graphic areas," it also requires an approximation of the geo-
graphic area most representative of competition in the cluster
market as a whole, even though the market for some products in
some areas may be highly concentrated.'29
Moreover, empirical evidence supports the Division's treat-
ment of loans to small and medium-sized business as a distinct
product market.. The market for small business lending is distinc-
tively "local" compared to markets for other banking products and
services;"' small business generally rely almost exclusively on lo-
cal commercial banks for working capital,' and use fewer finan-
cial institutions in general.m Continuing relationships between
small businesses and their local banking institutions provide access
to a greater amount of funds at a lower cost.' Competition
from non-bank and non-depository institutions is much weaker in
the small business lending submarket, especially with regard to
unsecured small business credit," 4 and debt securitization is not a
viable option for small firms as it is for large ones. 5 Thus, con-
Hmd, remains approximately the same in the two scenarios; but because it is
diluted by the inclusion of the non-bank-dominated product markets in the latter scenar-
io, it hides the fact that bank-dominated markets for products A and B are very highly
concentrated.
128. For instance, a bank's credit card business may be nationwide, its trust service
business may cover a significant portion of its state, and its commercial checking account
business may be entirely local. See Stephen Davis, Trust--and Antitrust, INSTITUTIONAL
INvESTOR, July 1996, at 66-67 (noting that "800 numbers, national credit card campaigns,
[and] automated-teller-machine-networks ... have pried open markets long dominated by
local banks").
129. See W. Scott Frame, Examining Small Business Lending in Bank Antitrust Analy-
sis, ECON. REv. (FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA), Mar./Apr. 1994, at 31, 33.
130. See id. at 32, 35.
131. See Elliehausen & Wolken, supra note 125, at 809 tbl. 6. (finding that 91.5% of
small and medium-sized businesses obtain credit from local institutions); see also Stephen
A. Rhoades, Competition and Bank Mergers: Directions for Analysis from Available Evi-
dence, 49 ANTrIRUST BULL. 339, 345-6 (1996) (noting that 84% of small businesses use a
local bank as their primary financial institution).
132. See Frame, supra note 129, at 35.
133. See Mitchell Petersen & Raghuram Rajan, The Benefits of Lending Relationships:
Evidence From Small Business Data, 49 J. FIN. 3, 3-37 (1994).
134. See Frame, supra note 129, at 35-36.
135. See CHRISTOPHER BESHOURI & PETER NIGRO, Securitization and Small Business
Loans 1-4 (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Economic and Policy Analysis
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sumers of small business loans demand that product from a very
limited geographic market, and often from one institution, even as
they turn to institutions in a wider geographic area for other prod-
ucts and services, such as credit cards and equipment financ-
ing.U1 6 Finally, small business customers do not demand commer-
cial banks' non-commercial products and services at all.137 Small
business lending thus is not transactionally complementary to other
products and services in the traditional cluster market, and should
be analyzed as a separate market.
In addition to being transactionally noncomplementary, the
market for small business lending is also a market that continues
to be dominated by commercial banks."' The market exhibits
increases in price when a local market becomes increasingly con-
centrated, 9 and decreases in supply when a local market is
served by smaller banks in multibank holding companies or by
banks owned by out-of-state companies." The market for small
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 94-8, 1994).
136. See Elliehausen & Wolken, supra note 125, at 809. Fifty-four percent of small
businesses acquire credit at their local institution, while only 14.3% acquire credit from
nonlocal providers; only 1.7% of small businesses acquire credit lines from nonlocal pro-
viders, as opposed to 22.8% from local providers. See id. On the other hand, 30.8% of
small businesses acquire motor vehicle or equipment financing from local providers, while
8.7% acquire such financing from non-local providers. See id.
137. See Note, supra note 126, at 919-21 (defining markets by separating the "house-
hold" market for banking products and services from the business market for those prod-
ucts and services).
138. See Frame, supra note 129, at 35-36. Even though banks' dollar share of the
small business credit market declined by two points between 1987 and 1993, banks still
hold over 60% of that market. See Cole et al., supra note 80, at 984, 988 tbl. 4. More-
over, after declining throughout the 1980s, banks' share of the market has held roughly
steady since 1990. See id. at 986 chart 1. The dominance of commercial banks in this
market is likely due to many of the same factors that make small business lending
transactionally non-complementary to other banking products and services, such as small
businesses' limited ability to acquire funding from non-local providers, and the low cross-
elasticity of small business commercial bank loans with other sources of funding (such as
debt securitization) that are viable substitutes for larger businesses.
139. See Timothy Hannan, Bank Commercial Loan Markets and the Role of Market
Structure: Evidence from Surveys of Commercial Lending, 1991 J. BANKING & FIN. 15,
133-49 (noting that the level of concentration in a local market for small business lend-
ing significantly affects the pricing of these loans).
140. See William R. Keeton, Multi-office Bank Lending to Small Businesses: Some New
Evidence, ECON. REV. (FED. RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CrrY), at 45, 45 (1995). Specif-
ically, the average ratio of small business loans to deposits at subsidiaries of multibank
holding companies is 5.5%, one percentage point less than that the same loan-deposit
ratio at independent banks and at holding companies' lead banks. See id. at 51. The
average loan-deposit ratio for banks owned by out-of-state bank holding companies is
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business lending is thus particularly susceptible to the potential
anticompetitive effects of bank mergers--effects that may be hid-
den by the cluster market method.
C. The Discounting and Exclusion of Thrifts and Nondepository
Partial Providers from the Screening Analysis
The effect of abandoning the cluster market method of prod-
uct market definition would be ameliorated if the Antitrust Divi-
sion were to give more meaningful consideration to the competi-
tive effects of thrifts and other partial providers. There is little
empirical justification for the discounting or exclusion of thrift
deposits from the calculation of depository HH[ for purposes of
Screens A and B. Thrifts generally hold a small but significant
share of the market for commercial loans, 41 especially in certain
regions. 42 Moreover, thrifts very often represent significant po-
tential competition. They often exhibit considerable unused capaci-
ty in commercial lending. 43 They may readily utilize that extra
capacity in response to anticompetitive behavior by in-market
banks ' and, under FIRREA, they may be converted into com-
mercial banks or merged into commercial banks. 45 Thrifts also
are significant competitors in markets for financial products and
services to individuals and households."4
even lower, at 4.7%. See id.
141. See Elliehausen & Wolken supra note 125, at 660-61 tbl. A.5.
142. See Cole and Wolken, supra note 125, at 637, 665 tbl. A.6 (noting strength of
thrift industry in New England).
143. See Katz, supra note 60, at 162 (noting that in pricing loans, "commercial banks
cannot ignore the fact that there is a vast pool of funds available from thrifts to satisfy
business borrowers' demands"); FISHER, supra note 17, § 3.12.1, at 3:90-98. This is true
even in light of statutory limits on thrifts' commercial lending powers; thrifts are allowed
to commit 10% of their assets to commercial lending, and to commit another 10% of
their assets to small business lending, see 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(2)(A) (1994). Since the
onset of the thrift crisis in the late 1980s, thrifts have not generally lent amounts suffi-
cient to reach these statutory ceilings, and thus still represent potential competition. See
FISHER, supra note 17, § 3.12.1, at 3:90-98. Moreover, some banking markets feature
numerous commercial banks whose loan portfolios include large amounts of commercial
real estate lending, and whose primary competitors therefore are thrifts; many banking
markets in California and Texas, for instance, fit this profile. See id.
144. See FISHER, supra note 17, § 3.12.1, at 3:90-98.
145. See id.; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1815(d)(2)(G) (1994) (authorizing conversion of
thrifts into banks, under certain conditions); id § 1815(d)(3) (authorizing merger of thrifts
into banks, under certain conditions).
146. See Arthur B. Kennickell et al., Family Finances in the U.S.: Recent Evidence
from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 83 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 20 tbL 13 (1997) (noting
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There is also little theoretical justification for the discounting
or exclusion of thrifts generally.'47 The Antitrust Division's dis-
counting of thrifts' deposits at the screening stage is predicated on
the assumption that those deposits do not in fact accurately repre-
sent thrifts' ability to compete with banks.' That assumption is
valid only in the context of the traditional banking cluster market,
where thrifts' competition truly was of a partial nature with regard
to the banking cluster market. If, as the Antitrust Division asserts,
that cluster market no longer exists,'49 and the product market
utilized at the screening stage is merely an aggregation of related
product markets for screening purposes, then thrifts' competition is
no longer "partial" at all; they are merely one sort of competitor
in some of the product markets being treated together at the
screening stage. In that context, the need for discounting disap-
pears.
In other words, if the Antitrust Division chooses to aggregate
a group of non-complementary products merely in order to facili-
tate a screening process, then the fact that some firms provide one
subset of that group, some firms another subset, and other firms a
third subset, does not require that the measurement of each firm's
share of the aggregate market be weighted according to the pro-
portion of the entire set of products that it provides. If the indicia
(i.e., deposits) being used to measure each firm's participation in
the markets for the screening group of products accurately repre-
sent each firm's ability to provide substitutes for some of the prod-
ucts provided by each other firm, then the firm's share of the
aggregated markets for the screening group, measured by those
indicia, will be accurately representative of its competitive effect,
and there will be no need for weighing. 5 The discounting of
thrifts' deposits for HM purposes was intended to account for
those institutions' inability to fully compete in the traditional clus-
that, even after the collapse of the thrift industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
thrifts still hold 11.3% of the market for consumer debt).
147. See FIsHER, supra note 17, § 3.12.1, at 3:90-98.
148. See id.
149. See supra Section I.B.2.
150.
If for example, one defines a hypothetical product market as consisting of two[non-complementary] products, there appears to be no economic rationale for
discounting the market share of an institution that offers only one of the prod-
ucts or decides to concentrate its marketing efforts on only one.
FISHER, supra note 17, § 3.12.1, at 3:97.
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ter market,"' the Antitrust Division's current approach to prod-
uct market definition in the antitrust analysis of bank mergers,
however, is effectively premised on the assertion that many prod-
ucts and services that were transactionally complementary and
deserving of treatment as a cluster market at the time of Philadel-
phia National are no longer so. If this is true, then the aggregation
of the markets for those products and services at the screening
stage is no longer compelled by market realities; it is merely a
jerry-rigged approximation of both a product market and a geo-
graphic market for screening purposes, and should be treated as
such. Doing so requires that thrifts' deposits no longer be heavily
discounted in, or excluded entirely from, HHI calculations at the
screening stage; if the Antitrust Division discovers special circum-
stances indicating that depository HI overestimates thrifts' abili-
ties to compete for at least part of the traditional banking cluster
in a particular case, then that fact alone could serve as grounds for
taking the review of the proposed merger to the case-specific stage
of analysis. 5"2
Moreover, if thrifts are to be discounted or excluded from the
screening analysis, there are significant problems with the use of
C&I loans-to-assets ratios as the test for such discounting or ex-
clusion. First, such tests generally fail to account for thrifts' and
other institutions' potential to enter the market in response to the
imposition of an SSNPI. In the antitrust review of mergers in most
industries, "even firms that do not currently offer the product in
question . . . are included in the market calculations if they have
the technological capability to provide the product without the
expenditure to" the imposition of an SSNPI.153 The C&I loans-
to-assets ratio test used by the Antitrust Division, however, ex-
cludes from consideration those institutions with C&I loans-to-
assets ratios below 2%, even though those institutions are likely to
have the capacity to enter the market-and even though those
firms are in fact participants in the market." Also, the choice of
151. See, e.g., United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 664 (1974) (re-
versing a lower court decision which concluded that commercial and savings banks occu-
pied the same "line of commerce," on grounds that commercial banks offer a unique
"cluster of services").
152. See FISHEi, supra note 17, § 3.12.1, at 3:90-98 (arguing that the discounting of
thrift deposits is "antithetical to the premise of a single market").
153. Peter E. Greene, DOJ Quietly Introduces New '2 Percent Test' for Bank Merger
Analysis, BANKING POL REP., Oct. 21, 1996, at 1.
154. See id In one case, in fact, the C&I loans-to-assets ratio of one institution ex-
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one value-2'%-as the determinant of an institution's inclusion or
exclusion from the analysis is unnecessarily arbitrary and rigid;"55
if a C&I loans-to-assets ratio test is to be used, it should at a
minimum allow for the inclusion, at a discount, of institutions with
varying ratios, as does the Federal Reserve's test for inclusion in
the depository HHI screening analysis. Finally, an institution's low
C&I loans-to-assets ratio "may also reflect weak market demand
conditions [and] may be indicative of nothing more than the exis-
tence of excess lending capacity in the market as a whole." 1 6 If
a C&I loans-to-assets ratio test is to be used, it "should be ad-
justed to account for local market demand characteristics.' 15 7
Because failure of either of the two initial screens will subject
a proposed merger to further scrutiny,58 the use of Screen B in
any case where a proposed merger would be expected to fail
Screen A but for the inclusion of thrifts' deposits effectively ex-
cludes thrifts' deposits from consideration for purposes of screen-
ing. Screen A is thus rendered superfluous and moot. Any inclu-
sion of thrifts in the screening analysis, in order to be meaningful,
will therefore have to .be complemented by the removal of Screen
B from the analysis.
The Antitrust Division addresses the issue of inclusion of non-
depository partial providers in the screening process in a round-
about fashion. As noted above, the EHI test used for bank merg-
ers differs from the test used for analysis of mergers in other
industries; 9 the test used for mergers in other industries re-
quires that the difference between pre- and post-merger HHI
values be less than fifty index points, while the test used for bank
mergers requires that the difference be less than 200 points. 60
The Division's requirement that the difference between pre- and
post-merger HHI values for a proposed bank merger be less than
200 points is intended to take into account the competitive effects
of partial providers who are not directly considered at the screen-
ing stage. 6'
cluded from consideration rose to over 4% in the three years after the merger. See id.
155. See id.
156. Neill, supra note 110, at 197.
157. Id.
158. See Greenspan, supra note 10, at 17.
159. See supra notes 106-111 and accompanying text.
160. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 12, § 1.51, at 38.
161. The Division has in fact indicated a willingness to recognize competition from
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As with the discounting and exclusion of thrifts from the
screening analysis, there is little theoretical or empirical justifica-
tion for treating nondepository partial providers (such as finance
companies and leasing companies) in so rigid a fashion. Over a
quarter of small businesses use nondepository suppliers of financial
services, 62 and one out of every five businesses obtain loans,
credit lines, or leases from nondepository financial institutions."a
This does not establish that nondepository institutions will be sig-
nificant competitors in all or even most markets; but it does indi-
cate that such institutions will be significant competitors in a sig-
nificant number of markets, and that a more case-specific method
of assessing their competitiveness is warranted.
The Antitrust Division's use of the Brookhaven test' 64 to ad-
dress partial providers' effects on competition is theoretically
flawed in essentially the same way as its exclusion of thrifts from
the HHI calculation. The more lenient Brookhaven test was based
on a characterization of partial providers' competitive effects in
the traditional banking cluster market; again, if, as the Antitrust
Division now asserts, that cluster market definition is no longer
analytically sound, then partial providers' different competitive
effects in various financial product markets (auto loans, home
improvement loans, credit cards, and so on) should be addressed
directly.
It is at this point that the shortcomings of the use of deposits
as a proxy for output-based measures in the HHI analysis become
apparent; nondepository partial providers by definition will not be
able to acquire a significant share of deposits by offering higher
interest rates in response to a bank's imposition of an SSNPI,'"
non-bank, non-depository institutions, but only if the prospective merger partners adduce
sufficient evidence to show that such institutions do in fact significantly compete in the
relevant submarket. See Greenspan, supra note 10, at 18.
162. See Elliehausen & Wolken, supra note 125, at 652 tbl. A.3.
163. See id. at 662.
164. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
165. An SSNPI imposed by a bank in the market for deposits would take the form of
a decrease in the interest rates paid for deposits. This action would thus be essentially
monopsonistic or oligopsonistic, rather than monopolistic or oligopolistic. The illegality of
such monopsonistic or oligopsonistic action under the antitrust laws is nonetheless clear.
See, eg., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235
(1948) (stating that oligopsonistic price-fixing scheme "is the sort of combination con-
demned by the [Sherman] Act, even though the price-fixing was by purchasers, and the
persons... injured . ., are sellers, not customers or consumers") (citations omitted).
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but they may well be able to acquire a significant share of auto
loans, or of credit card accounts, or of a number of other
submarkets of the traditional banking cluster market, in response
to banks' imposition of an SSNPI in these markets." In fact,
partial providers are steadily gaining market share in product mar-
kets formerly dominated by commercial banks.167 Using deposits
as a proxy for banks' market power "is tantamount to using the
amount of iron ore bought by a steel company, rather than the
steel produced by the company, as a measure of its market
share.' 6 Accordingly, banks' market share should be measured
by the same sort of output-based measures used in other indus-
tries; in the market for small business lending, for instance, that
output measure would simply be banks' respective volumes of
lending to small businesses within the relevant geographic mar-
ket-figures which banks can readily provide, or which can be
estimated on the basis of data already disclosed in banks' call
reports.69
166. For instance, if banks' rates on auto loans in a given geographic market were to
increase by one point, while auto financing rates stayed the same, one would expect con-
sumers to substitute funds from financing companies for funds from banks to a significant
extent; the same would hold true for home improvement loans, credit cards, and other
submarkets of the traditional banking cluster. The fact that many partial providers de-
pend on credit from banks for their working capital does not contraindicate such an
effect, because most such partial providers (loan companies, auto financing companies,
credit card companies, etc.) have access to credit from banks outside their local geo-
graphic market. These firms' supply of funds thus would not be affected by the SSNPI
imposed by the banks with which they compete on a local basis.
167. See James B. Amdorfer, Nonbanks Aiming for King of the Hill, AM. BANKER,
Sept. 9, 1996, at 4A.
168. FIsHER, supra note 17, § 3.7, at 3:54.
169. See Frame, supra note 129, at 38. Call reports provide lending data for the insti-
tution as a whole, not the branch-specific information often necessary to assess lending
within a particular geographic market. However, branch-specific figures can be estimated
by assigning to each branch a share of the institution's total lending proportionate to that
branch's share of the institution's total deposits. See id.
The Antitrust Division suggests but does not require that market-specific small busi-
ness lending data be provided, see OCC Screening Letter, supra note 106, at *4; the Fed
so suggests on occasion, but not in any regular or predictable fashion, largely because the
Fed has not been given the power to compel disclosure of this data for all competitors
in the market under review. See Alan S. Blinder, Antitrust and Banking, 49 ANTrrRUsT
BULL. 447, 450 (1996). Blinder, the former Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve, argues that "bank deposits are the absolutely worst thing to look at
in a competitive analysis-until you consider the alternatives." Id. However, Blinder inti-
mates that the Fed might in the future be willing to abandon the use of deposits as a
proxy. See id.
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The changes in the industry since Philadelphia National have
led the Fed to include thrifts and other partial providers in aggre-
gate depository H-H during the screening stage of its merger re-
view analysis, at a discount often determined on the basis of a
C&I loans-to-assets ratio test.170 At the latter, case-specific stage
of analysis, however, the Fed has maintained the cluster market
analysis that is explicitly intended for an industry in which thrifts
and partial providers do not count. If thrifts' and other partial
providers' deposits (as proxy for their competition in specific prod-
uct markets) are to be included in calculation of aggregate deposi-
tory HHI, then to decline to analyze those specific product mar-
kets at the case-specific stage is inconsistent;171 thrifts and credit
unions, by definition, compete with commercial banks only in
product markets constituting fragments of the "cluster" of products
and services that banks offer, and their competition with banks is
felt only in those particular submarkets. As explained in the previ-
ous section, approximation by aggregation may mask significant
concentrations in bank-dominated product markets by conflating
them with relatively diluted concentrations in non-bank-dominated
product markets, and may thus overlook significant concentrations
in particular product lines and particular geographic areas that
170. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text. The Fed's use of a C&I loans-
to-assets ratio suffers from many of the same problems that are attendant upon the Anti-
trust Division's use of such tests; for instance, they do not account for firms' potential to
respond to the imposition of an SSNPI, and they do not take into account local market
demand characteristics. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text. The Fed's three-
tiered test, see supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text, is however less arbitrary and
rigid than that of the Antitrust Division. The Fed's test also provides more meaningful
consideration of thrifts' competition by including thrifts in the screening analysis at no
less than 50% of deposits; the Antitrust Division's test, on the contrary, either includes
or excludes thrifts' deposits entirely. See Neill, supra note 110, at 196.
171. The inclusion of thrifts is consistent with the maintenance of the traditional clus-
ter market approach only if one assumes that all cases present the same mix of partial
providers, that the mix is not one in which banks still hold a dominant position in at
least one of the submarkets being included in aggregate HHI, and that the competitive
effects of these firms are otherwise accounted for in the screening analysis. If any one of
these assumptions is not valid, then the cluster market approach will retain the potential
to mask significant anticompetitive effects. See supra notes 125-40 and accompanying text.
In fact, the mix of partial providers varies from case to case, see supra notes 141-46 and
accompanying text, and banks do hold a dominant position in the market for small busi-
ness lending. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Fed's approx-
imation of the competitive effect of partial providers through use of the 1800/200 HIH
test suffers from the same shortcomings as the Antitrust Division's use of that test. See
supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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could result from some mergers.'7 These concentrations, if over-
looked, could result in the anticompetitive exercise of market
power by the survivor of the merger, to the detriment of competi-
tion and consumers.
This is especially true with regard to the market for commer-
cial lending to small and medium-sized businesses, where opportu-
nities for substitution in response to the imposition of an SSNPI
are particularly limited.' Because commercial lending is not
transactionally complementary to other products and services in
the traditional banking cluster market, the submarket for commer-
cial lending should be considered independently of the other
submarkets so as to "recognize competition where, in fact, compe-
tition exists. '74
HI. A SUGGESTION FOR RECONCILIATION
OF THE TWO APPROACHES
A. A Proposal for Reconciliation
As noted in the previous section, the Antitrust Division utiliz-
es a merger review procedure in which prospective mergers are
first screened for anticompetitive effects using an Hi calculation
based on deposits as a proxy for market share. The product mar-
ket at the screening stages is defined as the traditional cluster
market, and thrifts' deposits are discounted or excluded from the
EHI calculation.75 If a proposed merger fails either of the Div-
ision's initial screens, it is then subject to a more detailed analysis
in which the traditional cluster market approach is abandoned in
favor of the disaggregated submarket approach.'76 The Fed, on
the other hand, uses only Screen A, again using deposits as a
proxy for market share in a product market defined as the tradi-
tional cluster of banking products and services, and usually includ-
ing thrifts' deposits at a much higher weight than does the Divi-
sion. As at the Division, if a merger fails Screen A, then it will be
subject to more detailed review. However, the Fed maintains the
172. See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
174. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 326 (1962).
175. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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traditional cluster market approach to product market definition
even for purposes of this deeper analysis.
The Fed's approach could be brought into line with the Anti-
trust Division's, and the inconsistency' in the Fed's cluster mar-
ket analysis removed, by disaggregating the traditional cluster
market and directly analyzing specific product markets at the final,
case-specific stage of analysis. This disaggregation would remove
the potential of the cluster market method in the modem banking
industry to mask significant anticompetitive effects of a proposed
merger." It would also provide the flexibility to deal with the
partial providers of financial products and services that have made
significant inroads into many submarkets of the traditional cluster,
and the new kinds of partial providers that continue to appear,79
and thus ensure that those firms' market shares are not under-
represented in close cases.
This disaggregation might increase transaction costs of a pro-
posed merger, as potential merger partners could no longer use
the cluster market method as shorthand for a more detailed, prod-
uct-specific analysis of likely anticompetitive effects of their merg-
er."s However, the disaggregative approach need not be as
fraught with uncertainty as some practitioners have feared.' The
necessary data for testing specific bank product markets are not
significantly more unwieldy than the data involved in analyzing
product markets in other industries. In addition, the Antitrust
Division has enumerated what kinds of information are relevant,
177. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
178. See Note, supra note 126, at 925.
179. See id. A good example of new partial providers is the proliferation of "e-cash"
institutions, which act as financial intermediaries to facilitate convenient and secure mone-
tary transactions over the Internet and through other computer networks, and which
provide products very similar in structure to traditional banking products. See generally,
Penny Lunt, Payments on the 'Net How Many? How Safe?, A.B.A. BANKING J., Nov.
1995, at 46 (detailing the rise in the Internet banking system). Such institutions have the
potential to make relevant geographic markets for some products and services global,
even with regard to financial institutions in the smallest towns, and present numerous
regulatory challenges. See generally D. Lee Falls, Dateline 2005: Does Banking on the
Internet Need to Be Regulated?, BANKING POL'Y. REPT., Dec. 18, 1995, at 1.
180. See Frame, supra note 129, at 37.
181. See, eg., Division Officia Bank Counsellor Cross Swords Over Bank Merger
Reviews, Antitrust and Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1572, at 17, July 2, 1992 (quoting a
banking attorney's assertion that prospective merger partners "have no idea of what's
going to happen in any individual case. That makes the process more difficult and more
expensive.").
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making the process more predictable.1 2 Reconciliation of the two
agencies' different methods of product market definition would
also alleviate the need to produce different data in support of
applications to the different agencies for merger approval.
If after a period of transition to the disaggregative approach,
significant extra transaction costs would remain, then from an
economic policy standpoint, the question would become whether
or not these increased transaction costs are greater or less than the
deadweight social costs of any anticompetitive effects that use of
the disaggregative submarket method would prevent."" While a
detailed answer to this question is beyond the scope of this Note,
it may be noted that as consolidation in the banking industry
continues, potential anticompetitive effects of that consolidation
may be expected to arise more frequently."s
The Antitrust Division, meanwhile, should at a minimum do
away with Screen B,1 s and should regularly include thrifts' de-
posits in the HHI calculation in Screen A at a lesser discount, as
does the Fed, or at their full weight, as do the OCC and the
FDIC. 6 Both the Antitrust Division and the federal banking
agencies should also move from the use of aggregate depository
HI to direct measurement of market shares in particular product
lines such as small business lending (as the rationale behind the
disaggregative method would seem to require)."s
B. The Vestigial Philadelphia National Precedent
The issue of product market definition in the antitrust analysis
of bank mergers has very rarely been litigated in court since First
Hawaiian,s because prospective merger partners are loath to
182. See Guerin-Calvert & Ordover, supra note 117, at 678.
183. The deadweight social cost of the anticompetitive effects of a merger is the ag-
gregate loss of consumer surplus that results. See generally ViscuSi ET AL, supra note 3,
at 75-76 (defining and discussing deadweight social costs).
184. An omen of possible future anticompetitive effects may be seen in the fact that
from 1984 to 1994, the average HHil for urban banking markets increased by 181 index
points. The average Hi for rural markets, already highly concentrated, increased 140
index points in the same period. See Amel, supra note 1, at 14.
185. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 141-57 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
188. In all recent cases except United States v. Central State Bank, 621 F. Supp. 1276
(1985), prospective merger partners have simply acceded to the Antitrust Division's de-
mands for divestitures, and accepted a consent decree. See also Guerin-Calvert, supra
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hold up a merger in order to contest the point. 9 Thus, if the
Fed were to abandon the cluster market approach as has the Anti-
trust Division, then the holding in Philadelphia National would
essentially be a dead letter.
However, if the issue were to be brought to substantive re-
view, the structural and legal changes in the banking industry
would warrant a rejection of the cluster market method of product
market definition. The cluster market method no longer "recogniz-
es competition where, in fact, competition exists.""' Specific au-
thority for rejection of the cluster market approach is found in
Philadelphia National itself; the Court there rejected the argument
that "anticompetitive effects in one market could be justified by
procompetitive consequences in another" market. 9' This, howev-
er, is precisely what the cluster market method of product market
definition does in today's banking industry: it obscures-and on
occasion approves-large market shares in concentrated markets
by conflating them with smaller market shares in less-concentrated
markets." A court reviewing the agencies' definition of the
product market in a bank merger case should therefore accept the
Connecticut National Court's invitation to update the law on this
point,93 and hold that disaggregation of the traditional banking
cluster market is consistent with the dictates of the Clayton Act.
note 103, at 300 (noting that all the lawsuits seeking to enjoin bank mergers filed by
DOJ between 1990 and 1993 were settled by divestitures and were not litigated, and that
since then, DOJ has not even had to file lawsuits to cause prospective merger partners
to accede to divestitures).
189. See Davis, supra note 128, at 67.
190. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 326 (1962).
191. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963); see also Clark
C. Havighurst, Antitrust Issues in the Joint Purchasing of Health Care, 1995 UTAH L.
REv. 430-35 (noting that cluster markets as applied in health services markets "effec-
tively circumvent[]" the rule stated in Philadelphia National). Professor Havighurst also
notes that improperly-defined cluster markets, by obscuring the potential anticompetitive
effects of a merger, are as illegitimate as the archaic "worthy purposes" defense. See iL
at 435 n.77 & 424 n.43.
The current Comptroller of the Currency has in fact argued that anticompetitive
effects in some markets should perhaps be excused by procompetitive effects in other
markets, despite Philadelphia National's apparently plain foreclosure of this approach. See
Ludwig, supra note 67, at 477 ("[W]hile the focus in judging the effects of potential
mergers has been on the 'most damaged market,' it is not clear that a merger that
strengthens competition in most of the markets in which a bank competes should be
denied because of anticompetitive effects in a single market.").
192. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Even though the number of bank merger applications chal-
lenged by the Federal Reserve or the Antitrust Division is very
small, 94 prospective partners still face some uncertainty regarding
an anticipated transaction.95 Some of this uncertainty would be
alleviated if the Federal Reserve were to abandon its anachronistic
cluster market approach to the antitrust analysis of bank mergers,
and if the Antitrust Division were to embrace more meaningful
consideration of the competitive effects of thrifts and other partial
providers. This small measure of added predictability would be
complemented by the increased flexibility to account for new par-
tial providers and the greater analytical accuracy that these chang-
es would bring. A comprehensive refinement of product market
definition in the antitrust analysis 'of bank mergers would thus be
a beneficial adjustment for commercial banks, non-bank competi-
tors, regulators, and-ultimately--competition and consumers.
194. See Litan, supra note 10; Bingaman, supra note 2, it 469 (noting that during
fiscal year 1995, the Antitrust Division reviewed 1897 bank mergers, of which 1200 re-
quired competition analysis; only five mergers, however, raised "serious competitive con-
cerns" requiring curative divestitures).
195. See Glassman, supra note 3, at 4.
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